Wikileaks and Otto Perez Molina

Rachel Hatcher at the National Security Archives summarizes two recent Wikileaks reports from the US Embassy in Guatemala. Both cables details meetings between US Ambassador McFarland and Otto Perez Molina and Roxana Baldetti of the Patriotic Party.

Here is the summary from the September 2008 meeting.

2007 presidential runner-up General Otto Perez Molina told the Ambassador September 4 that he is concerned about Guatemala's deteriorating security situation and the GOG's apparent inability to follow through on institutional reforms. The state is institutionally unprepared to confront rising security challenges posed by narcotrafficking, corruption, and violent crime. President Colom announced a substantial expansion of the army, but the GOG's draft budget makes no provision for such an expansion.

Perez and his party's bench leader, Roxana Baldetti, also discussed the GOG's social agenda and the ongoing congressional finance scandal. Baldetti predicted that Congress would pass the pending Freedom of Information Bill. Greater political will is needed to address rampant criminal penetration of the state's rule of law institutions.

And the summary from the February 2010 meeting.

The Ambassador met February 17 with rightist opposition leader General Otto Perez Molina. Perez said the First Lady and her associates are preparing a smear campaign to falsely accuse him of human rights abuses during the internal conflict, and are trying to manipulate the judiciary to disqualify his presidential candidacy. Nonetheless, he was confident of winning the presidency in 2011.

Perez Molina's Patriot Party is prepared to work with the government in Congress to pass important rule of law reform legislation and would even consider supporting controversial tax reform, though the increasingly charged political environment threatens to derail the legislative agenda. The Ambassador thanked Perez Molina and Baldetti for their support for a new election of the head of the public defender's office.

Wikileaks Guatemala

Here are links to the other Wikileaks cables dealing with Guatemala .

CICIG Commissioner Discusses Progress and Challenges (March 2008)

Summary: In a March 14 meeting with the Ambassador and Pol/Econ Counselor, CICIG Commissioner Carlos Castresana discussed progress in establishing the CICIG office and beginning its first investigations. He outlined concerns over the extent to which some Guatemalan law enforcement organizations have been compromised by organized crime and corruption, and discussed the status of CICIG's current investigations, including progress in its investigation of the recent killings of bus drivers, organized crime rings within the police, and the high-profile February 2007 murder of three Salvadoran representatives of the Central American Parliament.

Castresana underscored the need to collaborate with the U.S. and other donor countries to provide reliable witness protection. Among other challenges, he cited the lack of coordination between the Ministry of Government and the Public Ministry, CICIG's lack of third-country security officers, and the lack of counter-surveillance expertise among Guatemalan security officers.

CICIG Commissioner Provides Update (May 2008). This cable relates to a briefing that Castresana gave to foreign ambassadors at a luncheon hosted by the Swiss Ambassador.

Relations between CICIG and the GOG - Castresana characterized them as good...

Castresana lauded Chile, Mexico and Uruguay for seconding professionals to work with CICIG. He hoped that the U.S. and Colombia could also provide personnel. CICIG was still very much in need of criminal investigators. Also important would be establishment of a winess protection program outside of Guatemala for Guatemalan witnesses.

Castresana said that law enforcement in Guatemala is essentially non existent and CICIG is in a sense doing an autopsy of collapsed institutions...

Castresana noted that the murder rate in Guatemala is decreasing. He attributed it to a drop in extra-judicial killings after Adela Torrebiarte took over the Ministry of Gobernacion in March 2007. Castresana estimated that at that time almost 6,000 people were being murdered in Guatemala every year; 25 percent of that total were extra-judicial executions. Comment: While the murder rate is declining, it is not clear to us that this is due to a decline in extra-judicial killings nor that previously 25 percent of all murders were extra-judicial.

Under Narco Threat, Rule of Law Collapsing in Coban (February 2009)

Summary: Confronted by the threat from three narcotrafficking groups, including recently arrived "Zetas" from Mexico, the local Rule of Law (ROL) apparatus in the northern city of Coban is no longer capable of dealing with the most serious kinds of crime. What is happening there is typical of many rural areas of Guatemala. Sources tell us that Coban's police are corrupt and allied with traffickers, and sometimes even provide them escort. Some judges and prosecutors are too frightened to do their jobs properly; others are in league with the traffickers. Asserting that security is not his job, the mayor is turning a blind eye to the narco-violence in Coban's streets. Wholesale restructuring of the ROL apparatus -- not mere personnel changes -- would be required for the state to adequately reassert its authority.

And here's part of Ambassador McFarland's final comment:

The process of loss of state control now underway in Coban has already occurred in other parts of the country, including Zacapa and Izabal Departments, as well as parts of Jutiapa, Chiquimula, San Marcos, and Peten Departments. Without outside intervention, Coban will join the growing list of areas lost to narcotraffickers.

With Encouragement from the Ambassador and CICIG, President Colom Approves Judicial Reforms (September 2009)

On September 2, Guatemalan President Alvaro Colom signed into law two important pieces of criminal legislation that had been supported by the international community. The two laws, one for plea-bargaining and one for &high-impact8 courts with additional security measures, would create new tools to help prosecutors successfully try and convict criminals. Colom had hesitated to approve the measures due to strong opposition from his General Counsel, Carlos Larios Ochaita. However, a last minute meeting on September 2 with the Ambassador and CICIG Commissioner Carlos Castresana convinced Colom to sign the reform bills into law. The entire episode speaks poorly of Congressional-Executive coordination. That said, the approval of the laws continues progress on judicial reform.

Former President Portillo Captured, Refuses Extradition (January 2010)

Summary: Former Guatemalan President Alfonso Portillo, indicted in the U.S. on money laundering charges and a fugitive from justice, was captured Jan. 26 as he was about to flee to Belize. The capture was the result of a joint operation involving CICIG, the Attorney General's Office, the Army, and the Police. The NAS helicopters provided critical support by ensuring that Portillo was brought before a judge in the capital within the six-hour constitutional limit. CICIG told Portillo he had the option of accepting an expedited proceeding that would lead to his quick extradition to safety in the U.S. Portillo refused, saying he preferred to face justice in Guatemala. Portillo's arrest is a powerful message for Guatemalans that no one is above the law.

And here are two quick reports from El Periodico and Siglo XXI.

A few comments.

In the March 2008 cable, Castresana said that bus companies were hiring gang members as security chiefs in order to protect them from other gangs extorting them. and in the May 2008 cable, there seems to be some confusion as to whether 25% of the country's 6,000 murders were the result of extrajudicial killings.

Castresana appears to have been shocked by the corruption and the absence of the rule of law, but there's no indication that he was overly frustrated with the international community or Guatemalan government's support for CICIG's work. Obviously, he wanted more assistance but there's no signs of desperation or frustration as related in US Embassy cables. In September 2009, we was frustrated with the inability of the executive and legislative branches to work more closely together, but so far there's little to indicate that he's contemplating resigning, which he does in June 2010.

The dominant theme in each of the cables is the concern for the absolute lack of a rule of law in Guatemala. Some judges, prosecutors, police and mayors are clearly intimidated by drug traffickers, organized crime and gangs. Others are in cahoots with those groups (it's unclear whether their relationship is simply based upon their interest in surviving or its their preference).

A source close to former President Alfonso Portillo gave CICIG and Guatemalan authorities the intelligence needed to nab Portillo shortly before he made his escape into Belize and shortly after a leak from "a state source" led him to evade authorities a day earlier. Castresana thought that members of the La Cofradia "might seek to murder him in order to ensure he does not collaborate with Guatemalan or U.S. authorities."

Castresana also said that Colom had been helpful throughout the investigation even though he thought that Portillo had helped to fund Colom's unsuccessful presidential campaign in 2003. It's good to know that Castresana and Ambassador McFarland thought that Colom was being helpful at this time.

In Guatemala, people liked to say that when you win the presidency in your third attempt, you not only owe the people who helped you in the last campaign, but you also owe all those who funded your first two losing campaigns. Colom was going to spend the rest of his life paying people off.

Wikileaks Guatemala - Reynoso Visit

Four Wikileaks documents related to Guatemala were recently released on El Pais. Here's one from December 24, 2009. In it, US Ambassador McFarland reports on Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Julissa Reynoso's visit to the country. The cable's subject is WHA DAS Reynoso's Visit Reaffirms Partnership with Guatemala.

Here's the summary:

During her December 13-16 visit to Guatemala, WHA DAS Julissa Reynoso met with President Colom, First Lady Sandra Torres de Colom, senior members of government, CICIG Commissioner Castresana, and representatives of civil society, the press, and the business community.

Colom focused on the situation in Honduras and Guatemala's pending tax legislation while the First Lady noted the positive impact of the many social programs which fall under the Social Cohesion Council, which she leads. Colom also expressed interest in making an official visit to Washington to meet President Obama and the Secretary.

CICIG Commissioner Castresana detailed the continuing challenges his commission faces in prosecuting cases in Guatemala and sought support for a U.S.-based CICIG office in Houston.

DAS Reynoso also visited various USG-supported projects which are decreasing rates of malnutrition, supporting microenterprise, and making the judicial system more efficient.

She also met with Otto Perez Molina, the principal opposition leader, who explained his party's platform for the upcoming 2011 elections.

DAS Reynoso's visit received wide and positive press coverage indicating interest on the part of Guatemalans in seeing high-level USG engagement.

With regards to Reynoso's visit with the Colom and Foreign Minister Rodas, it was interesting to read that Colom agreed with Reynoso that Honduran President Porfirio Lobo "seems like a well-intentioned interlocutor and someone who can restore peace to the country." It's unclear whether Colom was just being diplomatic or that's actually how he felt at the time. Anyway, his foreign minister interjected with

Guatemala will have to wait and see what happens. Rodas asserted that Guatemala could not accept that a coup, followed by elections, would somehow justify the illegal overthrow of the government. Rodas also noted that the USG's continued role in Honduras is critical to ensure a smooth recovery. According to Rodas, the economic and social impact of the crisis will only begin to be felt once a more stable government is in place.

In Reynoso's meeting with the First Lady, Sandra Torres de Colom highlighted the important accomplishments of her "My Family Progresses" program and said that she hopes that it will be "permanently institutionalized within the government." The Patriotic Party's presidential candidate, Otto Perez Molina, told Reynoso that he and his party also have a plan similar to My Family Progresses that will be part of their governing program. However, their program will incorporate "additional elements of transparency and accountability."
Another interesting meeting was one that Reynoso had with a dozen representatives from private industry and the influential coordinating Committee for the Chambers of Agriculture, Commerce, Industry, and Finance(CACIF). Similar to a recent cable on Mexico, the US government shows its disappointment with unelightened elites in Guatemala.

When DAS Reynoso pressed the private sector to focus on making practical solutions, they pushed the blame onto Colom and said that without a credible partner, they could not accomplish anything. DAS Reynoso pressed back, urging the private sector to take some responsibility for bridging Guatemala's extreme wealth distribution gap.

Finally, former CICIG Commissioner Carlos Castresana sought support for a U.S.-based CICIG office in Houston.

Wikileaks and Guatemala II

Wikileaks cable number 2 on Guatemala has just come to light. The subject of the second cable is the US  "Ambassador's Farewell Call on President Colom." The cable was written by outgoing US Ambassador James M. Derham on July 9, 2008.

The first revelation from the cable is that President Colom had decided to sign an agreement with PetroCaribe, but rejected overtures to join ALBA.

Colom defended his decision to sign a PetroCaribe deal with Venezuela and argued that the deal would help to alleviate rising fuel and food prices. The foreign minister added that the decision to join PetroCaribe was strictly economic. The Venezuelan government had pressured them to join ALBA anti-American trade block, but Colom was not interested and would not accede to any Venezuelan political conditions.

"We're Social Democrats, but we're not fanatics, and we're aware that radicalism in governance leads to failure," Colom said. [Italics mine]

I'm sure that the US was happy to hear this.  However, I'm not so sure how much ALBA members are going to appreciate being called fanatics. Maybe, he just meant Chavez.

President Colom lamented the recent deaths in a helicopter accident of Minister of Government Vinicio Gomez and Vice Minister Edgar Hernandez Umana and expressed confidence that newly appointed Minister Francisco Jimenez would continue to reform the police. Regarding the new Attorney General, Juan Luis Florido, Colom said he was amicable and was making a sincere effort. However, he expressed frustration at the office's inability to show advances with certain kinds of prosecutions, such as corruption, the murders of two union leaders, and the recent scandal over the illicit investment of congressional funds.

Colom also said Commissioner Carlos Castresana (CICIG) was very demanding and that CICIG was making some progress in helping the Attorney General's Office to put its house in order.

Colom called Nobel Peace Laureate Rigoberta Menchu a "fabrication" and said that she had incited indigenous residents of San Juan Sacatepequez to oppose local construction of a cement plant. Colom said that Menchu was at least partly responsible for inciting local opposition to the proposed plant and that during the opposition to the plant, at least one person had been murdered.  The US Ambassador seems to have been concerned with the impact that murder would have on foreign investors. 

In the statement that will most likely get the most foreign press, Colom called Menchu a "fabrication" of Elizabeth Burgos, the French anthropologist and author of "I, Rigoberta Menchu." (Colom has already responded that he respects Menchu even though he often disagrees with her and that he didn't say those things about her to the US ambassador).  While I don't think that fabrication is an accurate term to describe Menchu, Colom isn't the only person to have reservations about her story (See David Stoll). From what I understand, while Menchu and Burgos present the information in the book as purely biographical, some incidents did not occur as as Menchu and Burgos related them. Given the outrageous claims in book, I've always thought that it's held up pretty well against criticism.  I would hesitate to comdemn Colom's use of the word fabrication until I better understood the overall context in which he was using the term.

Finally, Colom said that Menchu is widely disliked by Guatemalan indigenous people, as demonstrated by her poor showing in the 2007 presidential election. I don't know about disliked. He's right that Menchu does not have a lot of political support. She has always been more popular internationally than domestically, so that's not much of a revelation.  In December's poll by Borge y Asociados, Menchu only captured 3% support for the presidency. And it's not a problem of name recognition, as in January 2009 96% of the population knew who she was.

All in all, I imagine that the left in Guatemala is not going to be too happy with what has been revealed whether or not Colom said such things or not, but it's not likely to be that significant. More to come, perhaps.

Cuba News

Gerardo Hernandez, one of the Cuban five currently serving a life sentence, now claims that the Cuban Air Force shot down two Brothers to the Rescue planes on February 24, 1996 in international airspace.  According to Hernandez, the two planes were not in Cuban airspace when its four passengers were killed as the Cuban government continues to insist. 

But now, spymaster Gerardo Hernandez, serving a life sentence, has made a startling about-face: In a last-ditch appeal, he suddenly agrees that the Feb. 24, 1996, MiG assaults on two Brothers to the Rescue planes happened over international waters.

With that argument, Hernandez is fundamentally contradicting the stand of the regime he has sworn his loyalty to, and which has declared him a modern-day hero of the revolution.

Honestly, I don't really understand why Hernandez's change of story is so "startling."  He must have concluded that at no point in the future would he be part of a prisoner exchange and that this change in his story was his last opportunity to avoid a life-sentence.

In other news, Cuban media publishing translated Wikileaks cables.  Cubadebate said that while only 62 Wikileaks cables relevant to Cuba (out of 2,080) have been published, the Cuban government will publish Spanish language translations of the released cables for those on the island to read for themselves. 

Apparently, seven cables have already been translated and released.  Several of the recently released Cuba documents deal with the US's take on dissident groups on the island (Opposition 'Needs to Reflect' on U.S. Criticisms Revealed by Wikileaks).   

In cables sent to the U.S. State Department, USINT chief of mission Jonathan Farrar does not so much disparage the Cuban dissidents as note their lack of influence on Cuban society, particularly young people, because their messages don't have much youth appeal.

The dispatches also indicate that the opposition groups waste energy "boycotting" each other, lack programmes for attracting a broad spectrum of Cuban society, and although they claim to represent thousands of citizens, USINT said it had seen little evidence of such support.

Another indictment in the cables is that "the greatest effort is directed at obtaining enough resources to keep the principal organisers and their key supporters living from day to day." Farrar cited the case of one who presented a USINT official with a budget to pay his group's salaries...

According to the diplomatic cables, Washington "should look elsewhere, including within the government itself, to spot likely successors to the Castro regime." They mention in particular that young people are disillusioned with the system, such as bloggers, musicians and artists, who take "much better" rebellious stances with a greater public impact.

The last sentence is pretty telling.  The US should probably look within the existing Cuban government "to spot likely successors to the Castro regime."  I would agree wholeheartedly and I probably would have agreed with that insight ten, twenty, maybe even thirty years ago.

However, if this is news to the US government, they need to find better analysts on the island.

W.T.F. CIA?

The CIA is preparing to combat any damage to the agency and its assets from the release of WikiLeaks documents by establishing W.T.F.

In a move that couldn't be more ironic, and made for headlines such as the above, the CIA adopted a task force. And like all things involving the military, or secrecy, acronyms are huge. So when the CIA developed the WikiLeaks Task Force, naturally, it was likely thinking of the KISS method – Keep It Simple Stupid.

But in doing so, the CIA has proved it either has a really good sense of humor or was trying to send a snarky message, or perhaps someone at the agency just didn't think hard enough about the name choice.

"Officially, the panel is called the WikiLeaks Task Force," The Washington Post reports. "But at CIA headquarters, it's mainly known by its all-too-apt acronym: W.T.F."

It couldn't be reason number three.  Too many people would have had to pass off on the name before it became official, right?

Wikileaks El Salvador VII and VIII - McDonalds

The subject of the seventh and eighth Wikileaks cables on El Salvador relate to McDonald's efforts to prevent anti-US FMLN judges from hearing its cases get a fair hearing in court.

The seventh cabled is entitled "Appeals Court Awards Former McDonald's Franchise $24 Million." The document was written by US Ambassador Hugh Barclay on December 21, 2005 during the second year of President Saca's administration.

Here's the summary:

In an unexpected twist in McDonald's ten-year legal battle with former franchisee Servipronto, the Second Court of Appeals ruled on December 7, 2005, that the U.S. fast-food giant had illegally terminated its franchising agreement with Servipronto on July 1, 1996, and therefore owed the local firm $24 million in damages for unrealized earnings during what would have been a 20-year extension, to June 30, 2016. One other case involving McDonald's and Servipronto has been resolved in favor of McDonald's, while two others are unresolved. The Salvadoran Courts are inefficient, politicized, and occasionally corrupt. Their inability to effectively enforce commercial law detracts from the country's ability to attract investment. Post will continue to encourage the Government of El Salvador to press for meaningful judicial reform.

The eight cable is an "Update on McDonald's Contractual Dispute."  This document was also written by US Ambassador Hugh Barclay on February 16, 2006.

Here's the summary for this cable:

On December 7, 2005, an appeals court ruled that McDonald's had illegally terminated its contract with a local franchisee on July 1, 1996, and therefore owed him $24 million in losses and damages. McDonald's is appealing the decision, but the composition of the chamber that will hear the case makes it unlikely that justice will be served. On February 10, McDonald's corporate representatives outlined for the Ambassador the company's strategy to pressure the Salvadorans to ensure a fair hearing by linking the case to CAFTA-DR implementation--an approach the Ambassador suggested would be counterproductive. They also outlined efforts to convince Salvadoran government officials of the importance that the case get a fair hearing, which the Ambassador agreed to support vigorously.

The Guardian has the story here.  In reading the cables, it appears that McDonald's was successful in several court cases against a former franchisee, Roberto Bukele.  Bukele lost his franchise rights after not abiding by the terms and conditions set by McDonald's.  However, in 2005 another appeals court found for Bukele.  McDonald's continued to engage in lobbying campaigns in both El Salvador and Washington in hopes of attaining a positive outcome to the case as it moved to the Supreme Court.

The Guardian labeled the story McDonald's used US to put pressure on El Salvador, but it could just have easily been written as "McDonald's Disappointed with Support from US Embassy." 

The US Ambassador and others mentioned the McDonald's case to President Saca and other members of the government, "emphasizing the stakes at play for a government in desperate need of foreign investment."  Depending on how this statement was conveyed, it could obviously be taken as a threat or simply a statement of fact.

However, the ambassador disagreed with some of the steps taken by (or threatened by) McDonald's and warned them that the actions would be counterproductive to McDonald's efforts to get a fair hearing in El Salvador and that they would undermine US economic interests in the country (the passage of CAFTA-DR).  From the February cable,

On February 10, McDonald's Vice President for Government Relations Dick Crawford and Maria Legett briefed the Ambassador on the company's efforts to see a fair resolution of the case. They explained that the company has engaged in a Washington-focused advocacy effort to put pressure on the Salvadorans to resolve the case according to the rule of law, suggesting that CAFTA-DR implementation should be delayed pending resolution of the case. The Ambassador, however, voiced concern that McDonald's strategy ran directly counter to U.S. interests in seeing CAFTA-DR implemented as soon as possible. Emboffs also noted that McDonald's invocation of CAFTA-DR in the lead-up to legislative elections would play into the hands of those who have resisted CAFTA-DR by alienating senior government officials who are already working to see that the case is resolved according to the rule of law and by complicating efforts to get additional CAFTA-related reforms through the Legislative Assembly. It would also unnecessarily thrust the case into the public spotlight, creating just the kind of negative publicity that McDonald's representatives have said they seek to avoid. Crawford acknowledged these concerns and agreed to tone down, but not cease, his company's efforts on this issue.

The Egomaniacal Alan Garcia

Wikileaks recently released a US diplomatic able that suggested Peruvian President Alan Garcia had "a colossal ego."  The cable also noted rumors that Garcia could be afflicted by manic depression or bipolar disorder.  Understanding the mental state of world leaders seems to have comprised a large percentage of the recently released Latin America cables.

However, what surprised me in the case of Garcia was his response.

"This is gossip, information you tend to get from your family, your spouse, at work from bosses, opinion, rumor," he said in a radio interview Thursday with Radioprogramas. "I don't feel offended, nor do I give it importance. But I will say there's a lot of poor-quality diplomacy."

If your spouse and family go around saying that you have a collossal ego or suffer from manic depression or bipolar disorder, you really have a problem.

Guatemala and Wikileaks - Sandra Torres

The first Wikileaks cable on Guatemala was recently released.  The entire report is about Sandra Torres de Colom and comes with the subject line is First Lady Prepares Controversial Bid for Presidency.  The cable discusses Sandra Torre's intention to run for president in 2011, praise of her skill in administering the government's social welfare programs, and her abrasive personality.  The cable was sent by the US Embassy in Guatemala to Washington on September 28, 2009.

Here's the summary:

Although she has not publicly stated her intentions, it is clear that First Lady Sandra Torres de Colom intends to run for the Guatemalan Presidency in 2011. Torres, who is to the left of her husband, President Alvaro Colom, is a controversial figure. She is the most able manager in the government, and also the most abrasive. Many poor, rural Guatemalans, ignored by previous governments, are grateful for her Conditional Cash Transfer and other social programs. Many middle- and upper-class urban voters tend to see Torres as a radical populist. Her sex and middle class provincial origins reinforce the upper class' distrust of her. The Guatemalan Constitution bars presidential family members from running, but Torres is likely to challenge that obstacle. Her efforts to do so would generate considerable controversy, given the politicization and corruption in judicial institutions. The First Lady's likely candidacy means that the current GOG is balancing governance with preparing for the 2011 campaign.

Most of the talk is pretty harmless and won't cause any problems between the US Embassy and the Guatemala Government.  Most people believe Sandra Torres is interested in running for president.  As of September 2009, the US saw her as one of the best managers in the government who played a very powerful role behind the scenes in all areas of her "husband's" administration. 

we believe the First Lady is by far the best senior manager in government (albeit not a transparent one): She is smart, hard-working, and demands results. At the same time, her abrasiveness has lost her some allies, and we suspect that her subordinates are reluctant to give her or the public bad news.

While there are questions about the constitutionality of her candidacy, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court will likely be sympathetic to permitting her to run.  Having this document now available publicly will likely speed up the discussion of who is allowed to run and who is not (See here).   

From my quick read, the most damaging / controversial sections of the cable are going to be the following.

There is some element of sexism and classism in the upper and middle classes' opposition to Torres. Guatemala is a conservative society, and the large, indigenous society to which Torres is appealing for support through her social programs is very male-centered...

Sandra Torres de Colom's assertive personality does not sit well with everyone in male-dominated Guatemalan society.

That's probably not going to play well.

The second quote is going to be read by some as evidence of Alvaro Colom's intention to remain in office beyond his term or to support his wife's candidacy even though it is unclear whether the constitution permits her to run.  It's not clear that is what he is saying, but I wouldn't be surprised if this becomes a headline.

Colom has also told the Ambassador that Guatemala's deep-rooted poverty, violence, and impunity could be resolved by the continuity of having the same party in power for two to three presidential terms.

Finally, one last quote stands out.

Much will change between now and Fall 2011, but different parties' plans for that distant event are already taking shape and impacting the political landscape. Guatemala's current electorate is distinct from that of many Latin American countries in that it ranges from center-left to hard-right.

Either the US does not see the URNG as hard-left or it does not even consider them a part of the political landscape in Guatemala.  It reminds me of something the Rodrigo Asturias told me in 2004.  He said that the press didn't say anything bad about the URNG in the papers.  The problem was that they said nothing about the party at all. 

Prensa Libre, El Periodico, and Siglo XXI have additional coverage while President Colom has already stated that the release of this document and others will not cause problems between our two governments.

Wikileaks El Salvador V

The subject of the fifth released Wikileaks cable on El Salvador is "Scenesetter for DoD Visit to El Salvador, March 8-9." The document was written by the US Charge d'Affairs Robert Blau on February 23, 2010, two weeks before a US Department of Defense delegation arrived to El Salvador.

Here's the summary:

Embassy San Salvador warmly welcomes the March 8-9 visit of Assistant Secretary of Defense Dr. Paul N. Stockton and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Dr. Frank Mora. Your visit comes while the GOES is in the midst of combating a public security crisis of the first order. It also comes at a time when the ESAF has emerged as a major player in President Funes's anti-crime strategy and his efforts to pursue a center-left, generally pro-U.S. agenda. Your visit will help reinforce the U.S. policy of active engagement with the GOES, which strengthens the moderate, pragmatic elements in the current administration.

Recent polls show President Mauricio Funes with an 80 percent approval rating and overwhelming public support for a strong bilateral relationship with the U.S. Funes has fostered strong ties with the U.S. and Brazil, though some in the FMLN have pushed him to strengthen ties with Venezuela and Cuba while de-emphasizing the U.S. relationship. President Funes' non-FMLN campaign support group, the Friends of Mauricio (now the Citizen Movement for Change), is largely in control of the economic apparatus of the government. Similarly, Defense is in the hands of a formerly-retired, recently-promoted military officer and Friend of Mauricio, Brigadier General David Munguia Payes. FMLN members control security, education, and intelligence elements of the GOES. Foreign policy is in the hands of a loyal FMLN member, but has thus far been characterized by pragmatism and outreach to the U.S. Combating violent crime and rejuvenating the economy are the GOES's top priorities, but the Funes administration has made little progress on either issue since taking office last June.

Again, the US Charge d'Affairs is just trying to paint a picture of events in El Salvador for the incoming delegation.  However, it's not entirely helpful to state that Funes controls economic policy and defense while the FMLN controls security, education, and intelligence without providing any context whatsoever.  Perhaps it is in other cables, but presumably one would want to know how this division of labor impacts both the design and execution of government policy.  Blau makes it sound as if Funes has no control of FMLN members in charge of education, for example when I'm not certain that that is the case.

The third section of the cable is confusing.  It begins by explaining that President Funes told Secretary of State Clinton that "his government needs a good relationship with the United States."  The paragraph then continues with a list of reasons why El Salvador needs a good relationship with the US.  However, the list of reasons appears to come from Blau and not Funes. 

Three out of every ten Salvadorans live in the U.S. and those who remain at home are avid consumers of all manner of American products, media, and culture. Nearly half of all Salvadoran exports are to the U.S. Given transnational crime links to and from the U.S. via Central America, there are no serious alternatives to cooperation with U.S. law enforcement agencies. The Salvadoran military admires and trusts our armed forces, and naturally look to us for training, equipment, and mentoring. USAID and MCC are prominent actors in social and conomic development and are held in high esteem by the GOES and the people of El Salvador. As a result, the Salvadoran public is among the most pro-American in the hemisphere. Even the hard-line FMLN recognize these points, if at the same time they do not forget our role in preventing them from seizing power with violence during the country's protracted and bloody civil war.

After giving an overview of the political situation in El Salvador (divisions within the left - getting worse - and the right - getting better), Blau emphasizes military-to-military cooperation between the US and El Salvador (Iraq, counter narcotics efforts, USNS Comfort, and natural disaster relief).  I'm surprised that the cable didn't go into more detail about how the supposed divisions within the Funes government are effecting (or might effect) military-to-military relations.  These insights would be particularly helpful to the visiting DoD delegation since much of the rest of the cable didn't seem that pertinent to their visit.

Blau then lays out US goals in El Salvador.

Our work in El Salvador is focused on (1) promoting improved public security; (2) supporting stable, democratic governance; (3) broadening economic prosperity; and (4) investing in people.

None of these are really controversial.  Obviously, the controversy results when you have to determine the best way to promote improved public security (greater use of the military? more police? legal authority?), broaden economic prosperity (increase tax rates and/or collection), invest in people (government spending on education and health? an increase in the minimum wage? greater labor protections? safeguard the environment?), and support democracy (is the hard-line FMLN supportive/capable of stable democratic governance?).

Finally, I'll leave you with Blau's conclusion.

Although the Salvadoran electorate granted President Funes a mandate for change, by all appearances the voters expect him to work with the country's dynamic private sector, and to maintain good relations with the United States. Despite continuing problems with crime and a weak economy, the public is pleased with Funes's work thus far - his approval rating is above 80 percent in recent polling. Tensions between Funes and the FMLN could undermine governability and potentially damage the bilateral relationship with the U.S. Meanwhile, transnational organized crime and violent street gang activity pose as serious threat to the stability of the country. Your visit will help reaffirm our commitment to assisting the GOES in combating this non-traditional national security threat while continuing our traditionally-strong military-to-military relationship.

Wikileaks around the Americas

Here are a few other Wikileaks stories of interest.

Venezuelan missile purchases worried U.S.: WikiLeaks: The US tried to prevent Russia and Spain from selling a variety of weapons to the Bolivarian Republic over the last five years.  I don't find that really surprising.  While the official rationale is that the US didn't want any of these weapons to fall into the hands of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, I can't imagine that the US would have been any more supportive of the arms sales if we were convinced that the weapons would remain in Venezuela.

Wikileaks: Data on what Cuba sacrifices for Venezuela oil:  Each year approximately 200 Cuban doctors serving in Venezuela leave the program and end up fleeing to the United States.

WikiLeaks cable: Diplomats predict bleak economic future for Cuba and US cable: Cuba to be insolvent within 2-3 years:  The US met with with commercial and economic counselors from five of Cuba's largest trading partners -- China, Spain, Canada, Brazil and Italy -- plus key creditor nations France and Japan - in February 2010.  Most representatives seem to have concluded that (1) Cuba would not make serious reforms in the near-term, (2) could survive this year, but (3) 2011 could be a rough year.  Within months, the consensus on number 1 was undermined by the government's slashing of 500,000 public sector jobs. 

Uribe proposed capturing guerrillas in Venezuela: In one December 2007 cable, Uribe supposedly "likened the threat Chavez poses to Latin America to that posed by Hitler in Europe."  While I am sure that this statement was meant to get the US to pay more attention to the threat that Chavez poses to all the Americas (if that were possible), for me it makes me not take the threat or source seriously.

Charles II of Mercury Rising, RAJ, and Quotha provide commentary on outgoing US Ambassador Charles A. Ford views on Mel Zelaya (see here for the May 2008 cable).  In some ways, for me, the cable answers why the United States did not put a diplomatic full-court press on following the coup that removed Zelaya.  The ambassador believed that Zelaya (and those around him) was corrupt, involved in organized crime and drug trafficking, not a friend to the US, and too cozy with Chavez.  Ambassador Ford also relates that "Zelaya also has been quite erratic in his behavior."  This is the same accusation / frustration that it many officials seem to have had with Zelaya following the coup.

Wikileaks El Salvador IV

The subject of the second fourth released Wikileaks cable on El Salvador is "With ARENA Fractured, Funes is FMLN's Only Rival."  The document was written by the US Charge d'Affairs Robert Blau on January 26, 2010. 

Here's the summary:

Eight months into the Funes presidency, the GOES can best be characterized as schizophrenic. The part of the government that Funes controls is moderate, pragmatic, responsibly left-of-center and friendly to the USG. The part he has ceded to hard-line elements of the (left-wing) Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) is seeking to carry out the Bolivarian,
Chavista game-plan, including implacable hostility towards the USG.

Divisions on the right have given the FMLN a dominant position in the Legislative Assembly. However, the FMLN does not have an outright majority in the legislature, and it faces strong opposition in the popular and independent-minded President Funes. Funes's popularity could erode quickly if his administration does not start showing visible results in reducing violent crime and reviving the economy. The government's long-run inability to tackle crime or produce economic growth, coupled with petty infighting and corruption within the country's political parties, raises questions about the future of democratic governance in El Salvador.

A few quick hits - First, I don't think that it is accurate to say that the hard-line elements of the FMLN are "seeking to carry out the Bolivarian, Chavista game-plan, including implacable hostility towards the USG."  The hard-line elements of the FMLN were Chavista before Chavez and will probably remain so when he is gone.  While they share affinity for Chavez and might receive support from him, it's not all about Chavez.  It doesn't allow policymakers in Washington to objectively weight matters in El Salvador when one side is characterized as Chavista.  Similarly, it doesn't make sense to characterize ARENA as center-right (which Blau does latter in the cable).

Second, I also don't think it is helpful to characterize Funes' foreign policy as "a moderate, pro-U.S. foreign policy."  I imagine that Funes is pursuing a foreign policy that he believes is in the national interests of El Salvador.  Fortunately, for the US and I would say the people of El Salvador, he deems economic and political cooperation on issues such as free trade, democracy promotion, and comprehensive immigration reform to be in the interests of the country.  It's not a "pro-U.S. foreign policy" but a "pro-El Salvador policy that seeks strong ties with the US."

Third, schizophrenic?  I'm not a doctor (well, not that kind) but here is Google health on schizophrenia:

Schizophrenia is a mental disorder that makes it difficult to tell the difference between real and unreal experiences, to think logically, to have normal emotional responses, and to behave normally in social situations.

All I see from the cable is a description of intraparty rivalries.  The president and vice president represent different factions of the FMLN-Friends of Mauricio coalition that came to power in 2009.  The two factions are competing to guide the country over the next 3+ years and beyond.  Funes has control over foreign and economic policy as well as the military.  Ceren and other hard-line elements of the FMLN are in charge of labor and education. 

Finally, how different would the cable have read during the twenty years of ARENA rule?  There are serious divisions within the party over the government's economic model and its approach to crime.  There are leadership battles within the executive branch and the party in preparation for the upcoming elections.  At the same time, the opposition (FMLN) is in chaos and the moderate members have been purged (Villalobos, Guardado, etc.). We might never know what those cables said, but they might not have been too different from the recent revelations.

Most of the remaining analysis in the cable is mere speculation.  The embassy is trying to work to understand the divisions within ARENA and the FMLN.  ARENA's division led to the creation of GANA.  There's some serious disagreement between Cristiani (and others) and the corrupt Saca.  One of the interesting tidbits here was Cristiani's orders to ARENA last January.

XXXXXXXXXXXX said that ARENA president Alfredo Cristiani has instructed party leaders to focus their criticism on the FMLN and avoid attacking GANA or President Funes, both of which ARENA views as potential allies. Until the 2012 legislative elections, however, ARENA will remain a marginalized force in national politics.

I'm not sure about a potential alliance.  It seems like smart politics to not attack a president with a near 90% approval rating.  At the same time, don't attack GANA because all new political parties that have splintered from ARENA and the FMLN have failed.  There's good reason to believe that the same would occur with GANA.

Wikileaks El Salvador III

The subject of the third Wikileaks cable on El Salvador is "FMLN Affirms Socialist Course; Leadership Acknowledges Need for Strong Relations with U.S."  The document was written by the US Charge d'Affairs Robert Blau on December 15, 2009.

Here's the summary:

At its 25th annual convention December 13, the FMLN, without President Funes present, voiced solidarity with Cuba and Venezuela, repeated opposition to "the Empire," and voted to join the Fifth Socialist International. It decided to devolve authority to select candidates for local office to local party organizations. Senior FMLN leadership told us December 14 there had been no change in the FMLN's stated desire for good relations with the U.S. and attributed some of the anti-U.S. rhetoric by FMLN members (including VP Sanchez Ceren) to events outside of El Salvador, and an inability to adapt to new circumstances.

The cable starts off with a summary of the XXV 2009 Convention where the party reaffirmed its socialist platform.  That's nothing new (as I'll mention in the next post). 

Blau then goes on to summarize a meeting help between Embassy officials and FMLN representatives Medardo Gonzalez, Sigfrido Reyes, and Oscar Ortiz on December 14.

Medardo Gonzalez, FMLN General Coordinator and head of legislative bloc, Sigfrido Reyes, FMLN Spokesman and Assembly Deputy, and Oscar Ortiz, Santa Tecla Mayor. Gonzalez atated categorically there had been no change in the FMLN's stance of seeking a constructive relationship with the U.S. Noting recent statements by VP Sanchez Ceren criticizing the U.S., the three were quick to say there was no anti-U.S. policy in the FMLN and, on the contrary, the FMLN and the Funes Government saw strengthening U.S.-Salvadoran relations as a priority.

In many ways, I think that the FMLN representatives are just telling the US Government what they want to hear.  The truth is that there is a split within the party.  There are some who see a strong relationship with the US as crucial to the stability and future of El Salvador while others see the FMLN's future aligned more closely with ALBA and other leftists governments in Latin America.  It's not uncommon for members of a political party to be divided on such issues of foreign and economic policy.  Granted, in the case of El Salvador, the polarization between parties (the FMLN and ARENA) and within parties (the FMLN) is a little more extreme than most. 

Ortiz explains that extreme rhetoric coming from the Convention and the VP as a reflection of some failing to adapt to new times.

Ortiz suggested much of the anti-Imperialist commentary still emanating from the FMLN was, in part, a function of the party's slow adaptation to a new world of governing and the difficulty of setting aside long-held political rhetoric.

I'm sorry, but this sure sounds like Villalobos and the ERP/RN cadre in the early to mid-1990s.

And the final comment from Blau

The FMLN's historic, guerrilla roots run deep, and the rhetoric of years on the battlefield and two decades in opposition will not disappear quickly, or maybe ever. While our outreach to the FMLN during the 2008-2009 campaign and since Funes' inauguration has paid off in open channels of communications, we continue to combat old suspicions of U.S. motives in El Salvador and the region. On the other hand, good relations with the U.S. enjoys a 90 percent approval rating. If the FMLN overdoes its radicalism, it will have a hard time sustaining its current electoral advantages.

Blau analysis seems accurate.  There are good reasons why the FMLN and the US government do not get along and the relationship might never improve to the extent the people of El Salvador and the US would like. 

However, the last sentence is a little difficult to understand without additional information.  I'm not sure what it would mean for the FMLN to overdo its radicalism - start nationalizing businesses and property?  emphasizing popular democracy?  strengthening ties with Communist Cuba and China?  joining ALBA? 

And with regards to "sustaining its electoral advantages,"  there is little that the FMLN can do in the next five to ten years that will cause it to lose enough popular support so that it is no longer the first or second largest party in the country.  I don't know, it's just not a really helpful insight.

Wikileaks El Salvador II

The subject of the second released Wikileaks cable on El Salvador is "Wave of Protests May Signal FMLN Effort to Undermine Funes."  The document was written by the US Charge d'Affairs Robert Blau on August 28, 2009. 

Here's the summary:

A recent wave of protests organized by a so-called environmental group, "La Coordinadora Nacional de Medio Ambiente (CNMA)", are likely part of a movement by hard-line elements of the FMLN to undermine President Funes. Over the past several weeks, the CNMA has carried out large-scale, coordinated protests throughout the country ostensibly protesting GOES plans to continue with the construction of the hydroelectric dam "Chaparral" and perceived inequities in the seed disbursement program to farmers. It seems that hard-line members of the FMLN party are using this relatively unknown organization to vent their frustration about the direction of economic policy and directly challenge the President.

Blau then comments:

Mass street protests are part of the traditional FMLN play book and are one battlefront in an ongoing struggle for power between the orthodox FMLN and President Funes. Funes said at a meeting Thursday August 27 that his administration will not yield to blackmail. There is broad public support for the need for Funes to prevail.

Sorry, but I don't know anything about these strikes and neither does it appear from the cable that Blau does (or at least he isn't saying). 

Blau argues that these protests were "sophisticated" because they involved a simultaneous "series of road blocks at nine key points in the highway" while "past CNMA protests consisted of no more than small-scale demonstrations outside of the Presidential Palace." 

Therefore, they must have been organized by the FMLN and they must have been an attempt by hard-liners to undermine Funes.

Anybody have any more information?

Some additional Comments on Wikileaks El Salvador I

Let me just add to the first leaked cable why I didn't find that much revealing from it.

For much of the FMLN's existence as a political party, the orthodox wing of the FMLN has continually forced out the "moderates" (those that eventually formed the PD and the FDR, among others).  Finally, in 2004 the orthodox wing adopted a plan to eventually realize socialism in El Salvador - a plan that ended any debate within the party about social democracy (or a more socially conscious capitalism) versus socialism.  From an unpublished paper with Alberto Martin, we wrote

In a doctrinal document drafted in 2004 by order of the National Council, the FMLN established a strategy of transition to socialism that would first pass through a phase of state takeover and deepening of democracy (FMLN 2004). To achieve power, they raised the possibility of concluding a series of broad political alliances with non-revolutionary sectors in the short-tem. This policy is a tactical partnership with those political forces that the FMLN leadership considered democratic, but not left. In the words of José Luis Merino one of the party’s historic leaders:

"The road to socialism passes through the democratization of the country, in that sense all the democratic forces are our potential allies ... We have a strategic objective that might take ten, 20 or 30 years, because until one arrives at conscience: one arrives at socialism. To get there you have to consolidate democracy" (El Faro 2005).

The FMLN's avowed goal of socialism (and thereby stronger relations with Venezuela and Cuba) is not compatible with Funes' social democratic vision for the country (with strong US ties).  Instead, the FMLN sees Funes as a bridge to a time when Salvadorans would accept a true FMLN candidate.

The Friends of Mauricio and the Citizens Movement for Change were created because Funes lacked support among the FMLN party leadership.  These friends' groups give him some organized support within the country and maybe leverage within the party. 

These organizations were also created to convince non-FMLN (both domestic and international) of his administration's moderate / pragmatic approach to the country's problems, hopefully as a counterweight to the orthodox VP.

Wikileaks El Salvador

Cables between the US Embassy in El Salvador and Washington, D.C. have begun to leak out.  Spain's El Pais has coverage here .  There are links to the cables at the bottom of the page.  I am in the middle of grading, so I'll probably just take a stab at one cable per day.

The first cable is dated August, 21, 2009 and deals primarily with relations between President Funes and the FMLN.  The cable's subject line is "FRIENDS OF MAURICIO: FUNES NEEDS YOUR HELP."  While Funes did not write it, I can't imagine how this is going to win him friends among the FMLN.



First, the cable enters in to a bit of a discussion about the then recently constituted Citizens Movement for Change, formerly the Friends of Mauricio Movement.  It's unclear who the US Charge d'Affairs Blau met with, but the source concluded that

the near-term goal of the organization was to accompany President Funes as he governed and to provide him non-FMLN political support during his term.

A second area of the cable dealt with Funes' concerns about his physical security and that of the integrity of his officials' communications.  Funes is worried about the physical security of the president's house.  In one failure, intelligence officials did not provide him with advanced warning of protestors camping out in front of the presidential compound.  Funes was disappointed that Eduardo Linares (aka Douglas Santamaria), the Director of the Salvadoran State Intelligence Organization (OIE), failed to learn of the protestors ahead of time.  Linares also withheld information from the president including daily intelligence briefings and even information about a visit to the country by the Venezuelan Foreign Minister shortly after the Honduran coup. 

Funes was also concerned that hard-line members of the FMLN were listening in on his phone calls as well as those of other non-FMLN members of the Government.  Interestingly enough, he was asking the US Government for assistance and the US was open to the request.

Funes also wanted US assistance in interrupting phone calls from prisons, presumably involving extortion rackets.  However, the US was reluctant to work with the Manuel Melgar, the Minister of Public Security and Justice.  The source told Blau that

Melgar's appointment was not taken to display any disrespect to the U.S., but had been a compromise with the FMLN, which had sought appointment of FMLN hard-liner Jose Luis Merino (aka Ramiro Vasquez) as Public Security Minister.

Funes, he said, had pushed back and preferred to name Melgar to that position because he had developed a certain rapport with Melgar during the campaign. XXXXXXXXXXXX described Melgar's behavior around Funes during the campaign as compliant and loyal to Funes, characteristics he said would not have been the case with Merino. XXXXXXXXXXXX said Funes would consider new information on Melgar and take appropriate action, fully cognizant of Melgar's linkage to the 1985 Zona Rosa killings.

From this August 2009 cable, it's clear that Funes' relationship with the FMLN was a clear concern for the US Embassy just a few months into his administration.  This isn't much of a surprise.  I think that this was (and is) a topic that everyone was interested in learning as much about as possible.

The information is nothing extraordinary, but the extent to which Funes was reaching out to the US for help and his mistrust of FMLN hardliners are likely to increase tensions between him and the FMLN.